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Abstract 
This paper analyses the level of outsourcing among the actors of the humanitarian response system to aid those 
impacted by natural disasters as well as the system to aid those impacted by the armed conflict in Colombia. Based 
on reports produced by the actors involved, in addition to several interviews conducted with individuals directly 
involved in the relief operations, this paper characterizes the supply chain food aid distribution and analyses the 
implications drawn from the differences between the levels of outsourcing identified. Supply chains are codified in 
four segments for analysis purposes:  logistics operations supporting the disaster area (upstream), in the disaster area 
(midstream), and to beneficiaries directly (downstream and last mile distribution as two individual segments). The 
number of third parties, whether humanitarian aid organizations or private contractors, participating in the supply 
chains as actors orchestrating food aid distribution to beneficiaries, drives the levels of outsourcing. Groups of 
supply chains from representative established organizations deploying a vast portion of food aid distribution are 
studied. These groups are analysed to illustrate differences and commonalties, and reach conclusions of general 
applicability. Based on the findings, the paper makes policy implications to increase performance of future food aid 
distribution operations in response to larger scale disasters as well as opportunities for future research.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Background 
The humanitarian response in Colombia is orchestrated by several relief organizations that vary not only in size, 
geographic coverage and affiliation type, but also by event type as natural hazards are not the only threats that 
socially vulnerable citizens have to deal with since the armed conflict began over 50 years ago. The armed conflict 
has caused the dispossession of land of around 6 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) with a relative stable 
average of 300,000 new IDPs every year [1]. In addition, Colombia suffers more than 600 natural disasters a year, 
the highest rate of recurrent natural disasters in Latin America [2]. The number of disasters is also on the rise, with 
85 percent of the population and assets located in areas exposed to two or more natural hazards and records of more 
than 4.5 million persons impacted by large-scale disasters [3]. Such doble afectación, which translates to “double 
effects” has caught the eye of several international NGO’s, UN agencies and other major private organizations who 
have witnessed the humanitarian response that Colombian governmental organizations have provided to people 
impacted by both natural and manmade disasters. In some cases, these witnesses have collaborated with the 
governmental response, but in other instances, they have been the only relief organizations who have assisted 
specific populations in remote areas where the humanitarian assistance from the State have been simply non-existent 
or untimely. The reasons that explain this absence vary from the constraints that the armed conflict imposes, to 
governmental operators who inherently are actors of the conflict itself, to the infrastructure and other external 
variables that challenge the humanitarian assistance that is to be provided by law. 
Outsourcing operations throughout the supply chain is a common practice in the commercial logistics sector. 
However, despite the fact that the literature has stressed that care should be taken when comparing key features 
between commercial and humanitarian logistics [4], established relief organizations outsource a variety of logistics 
operations to third parties, that all together, create relief networks aiding those impacted by manmade and natural 
disasters in Colombia. Thus, these established relief organizations together create two humanitarian systems 
disconnectedly responding to manmade and natural disasters that are typically either recurrent and small or random 
and large.  
1.2. Objective and Research Overview 
This research focuses on Post-Disaster Humanitarian Logistics (PD-HL), understood as the most intensive form 
of logistics in the initial response and short-term recovery phases of an event [4]. The objective of the research is to 
characterize the role of outsourcing in the supply chain in order to identify opportunities for improving the 
performance and even opportunities to optimize the storage, transport and distribution capabilities of actors, relief 
networks and humanitarian response systems.  
To accomplish this, this research identifies actors and relief networks that can perform better in local distribution 
and those that can do a better job storing and transporting bulk aid to and in the disaster area within each 
humanitarian response system. In addition, general policy implications are developed for achieving transverse 
logistics synergy among actors and relief networks belonging to a distinct humanitarian response system. 
The heterogeneity among relief actors and networks in Colombia draw on the heterogeneity of the supply chains 
through which humanitarian aid is deployed to both the natural disasters’ and the armed conflict’s beneficiaries. 
Consequently, this paper elaborates on the identification of actors that orchestrate PD-HL operations responding to 
recurrent and multiple small-scale disasters, specifically, food aid that is distributed locally to beneficiaries, 
irrespective of the source of the need, from either manmade or natural disasters. This initial identification is based on 
secondary information found in open documents and reports available online complemented with individual 
interviews of practitioners who have significant experience directing humanitarian operations in Colombia.  
Having identified the actors directly involved in food aid distribution, the paper elaborates on the characterization 
of supply chains derived from such actors. Following a similar approach for the identification of actors, a set of 
interviews adds specifics of the supply chains that are initially built from secondary information available from the 
respective actors’ websites. However, given the constraints for accessing both primary and secondary information 
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from all the actors initially identified, supply chains for only five strategic relief networks are fully characterized. 
These are characterized as follows:  
x Armed conflict response system 
o International representing the UN Cluster approach†: World Food Program (WFP)  
o Domestic representing the institutional approach‡: Unit for Assistance and Reparation of Victims (UARIV) 
x Natural disaster response system 
o Domestic: Colombian Red Cross (CRC), 
o Domestic representing the institutional approach: Civil Defense, and National Unit for Risk and Disaster 
Management (UNGRD) 
 
Field work identified actors, both domestic and international, that have relied on third parties for certain logistics 
operations when aiming to deploy food aid to beneficiaries. These third parties range from other humanitarian actors 
to operators and suppliers from the commercial sector. The research is also based on interviews with individuals 
directly involved in the relief operations. The interviews took place both in person in Colombia and by 
videoconference. This information is complemented with media accounts and official reports.  
The end product of this research identifies relief networks from five of the largest established humanitarian actors 
in Colombia, characterizes their supply chain logistics operations from upstream to downstream and codifies actors 
as they act as a third party participating in warehousing and distribution operations.  The analyses’ limitations stem 
from the fact that not all established actors and relief networks involved in food aid distribution in Colombia may 
have been identified due to resource limitations. Hence the supply chains captured in the study are not guaranteed to 
represent the total universe. In addition, not all the segments of the supply chains identified were characterized due 
to some constraints found in the fieldwork when accessing specific information. However, because at least one 
supply chain of all actors and relief networks identified has been characterized along all its segments (upstream, 
midstream and downstream) and given the heterogeneity of proceedings in national operations, a significant 
representation of the levels of outsourcing at a national basis can be inferred. 
The following nomenclature is used in the paper.  
Nomenclature  
A1, A2    primary actors in the armed conflict humanitarian response system 
N1, N2, N3   primary actors in the natural disaster humanitarian response system 
PA, PB, PC, PD and PE  five private actors who provide logistical support 
IA, IB, IC, ID, and IE four institutional and one international actor, also providing logistical support 
1.3. Outline of the Paper 
The paper has an introduction and six sections. Section 2 provides a brief summary of the methodology used. 
Section 3 defines the level of outsourcing approach of food aid supply chains. Section 4 and 5 introduces the 
characterization of supply chains and specifics on the level of outsourcing for the armed conflict response system 
and the natural disasters response system respectively. Section 6 analyzes and suggests implications throughout the 
supply chains. Section 6 is broken down into supply chain segments so that comparative analysis can take place 
between relief networks within the same response system. In contrast, section 7 finalizes the paper with conclusion 
remarks about implications for creating transverse synergy among relief networks belonging to distinct humanitarian 
response systems.  
 
 
† Groups of organizations, both UN and non-UN, in each of the humanitarian sectors of humanitarian action, e.g. 
water, health and food security. 
‡ Groups of governmental humanitarian organizations. 
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2. Brief summary of the methodology used 
 The research involved: 
i) Compilation, summarization and archiving of all relevant media articles, literature and reports that led to an 
initial identification of actors involved in food aid distribution for both response systems and to the 
magnitude of the impacts of manmade and natural disasters in Colombia.  
ii)  Secondary information analysis that classifies actors and relief networks within each response system in 
order to build an initial identification and characterization of actor.  
iii) Conduct of formal interviews whether in-person, by telephone or videoconference to refine the 
identification process from secondary sources and to enhance the understanding of the role that the actors 
were found to play when distributing food aid to beneficiaries.  
iv) Compilation and archive of relevant technical reports both provided by interviewees and links suggested 
for download from their websites that give better illustration of the specific logistics operations run to 
deploy food aid.  
v) Analysis of secondary information regarding the key logistics features through which the supply chains 
would be characterized.  
vi) Conduct of formal interviews whether in-person, by telephone or videoconference to refine and better 
elaborate and represent the flow process of food aid commodities along the supply chain.  
vii) Collective analysis of information provided to identify the level of outsourcing of the relief networks and 
actors identified and to suggest policy implications.  
In general terms, the research protocol promised that the identity of the participants would be kept confidential. The 
interviewees represented established organizations large and small, international and local, governmental and non-
governmental. The interviewees were individuals at different positions within the organizations, from the upper 
management, to those at technical and operational levels. The organizations interviewed, had different functions 
within the overall HL process, from procurement, transportation, and staffing, to the organization, care and 
distribution of critical supplies to beneficiaries.  
 
3. Supply chain outsourcing 
This research identified different levels of outsourcing throughout the established supply chains responding to 
both manmade and natural disasters in Colombia. This outsourcing impacts the overall performance of the supply 
chain. To better understand these impacts, we characterize the role of logistics actors, both humanitarian and private, 
from upstream to downstream in the supply chains.  Starting with the identification of established international and 
domestic actors directly involved in food aid distribution during the immediate response and short-term recovery, 
and continuing with the identification of relief networks that these actors belong to when orchestrating food aid, the 
participation of logistics actors whether private or humanitarian throughout the supply chain is identified. Given the 
disconnect between the humanitarian response systems for those impacted by manmade and natural disasters in 
Colombia, commonalities and differences in these response systems resulting from contrasting transverse logistics 
actors and relief networks, are highlighted here.  
Table 1 presents a snapshot of the results obtained after coding the data from the interviews and document analysis 
described in section 2, which is further elaborated in sections 4 and 5. The coding identifies the role of specific types 
of actors in each stage of the different distribution networks. To identify activities involving outsourcing, the 
following codes are defined: 
x A1, A2 represents the primary actors in the armed conflict humanitarian response system, 
x N1, N2, N3 represents the primary actors in the natural disaster humanitarian response system, 
x PA, PB, PC, PD and PE represent the five private actors who provide logistical support, 
x IA, IB, IC, ID, and IE represent the four institutional and one international actor, also providing logistical 
support. 
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For example, in a natural disaster, the distribution of food aid to beneficiaries by the Colombian Red Cross is done 
by the Colombian Red Cross (coded N1) and private real estate (coded PE). By combining the coding with the 
supply chain segment and response system, Table 1 indicates how each of these logistics actors is involved in the 
humanitarian operation that the actual humanitarian actors, also grouped by the type of relief network, are 
responsible for. Thus, the upstream segment of the supply chain displays the logistics actors that operate the 
facilities needed for starting to deploy food aid to the disaster area. The midstream and downstream segments 
displays the similar situation for facilities operated very close to the disaster area or in the disaster area itself. 
Finally, the beneficiaries segment is defined to specifically refer to the operation of directly handing food aid to the 
impacted. Links between segments exclusively denote actors running transport operations.   
Table 2 shows the frequency of recurrence of outsourcing operations and the actors illustrated in Table 1. Table 
2 draws on Table 1; it summarizes the number of times that an agency is directly operating either storage or 
transport throughout the respective supply chain segment. For instance, Table 1 illustrates that Carriers, coded as 
PB, directly operates the transport of all actors in the upstream segment. Hence Table 2 states that carriers indeed 
perform 5 transport operations throughout such segment. 
The number of parties involved in a logistics operation fluctuates between 5 and 8 according to the supply chain 
segment and specific outsourced operations (warehousing and transportation). The midstream segment is the 
segment with the highest number of parties involved considering both response systems. It can be also noted that 
100% of the logistics operations characterized are outsourced to at least one logistics or humanitarian actor, which 
explains the reason why both the UARIV and the UNGRD have no logistics operations run by themselves. 
Conversely, institutional actors such as the Police Department and the Civil defence, present the highest numbers of 
logistics operations run. This reaffirms that these two institutions are at the cornerstone of logistics support for the 
UNGRD and potentially to the UARIV. Likewise, carriers are the most recurring non-official logistics actor, also 
reaffirming their key role in both humanitarian response systems, and exposing the importance of approaching this 
actor strategically and centrally when considering synergies that benefit reaching those in need. 
Table 1. Outsourcing coding for humanitarian and private actors running logistics operations. 
Supply chain 
segment 
Humanitarian Response System 
Armed Conflict  Natural Disaster  
International 
(UN Cluster 
approach) 
Domestic (Institutional 
approach) 
Domestic (Red Cross 
approach) 
Domestic (Institutional approach) 
WFP – A1 UARIV – A2 Colombian Red Cross – N1 Civil Defence – N2 UNGRD – N3 
Upstream A1, PC PA N1, PD, IA N2, IA PA 
Link PB PA, PB N1, PB, IA N2, PB, IA PA, PB 
Midstream A1, PC PE, ID N1, PD, IA N2, IA ID, PE 
Link PB ID N1, N2, PB, IA N2, IB, IC PB 
Downstream IE, PE ID N1, PE, IA N2, IA  
Link IE ID N1, N2, PB, IA N2, IC, IA  
Beneficiaries IE ID N1, PE N2, PE ID, PE 
Facilities/links A1 A2 N1 N2 N3 
LEGEND 
Actor Organization/ Function Code 
Actors armed conflict humanitarian response (A) WFP 
UARIV 
A1 
A2 
Actors natural disaster humanitarian response (N) CRC 
Civil Defence 
UNGRD 
N1 
N2 
N3 
Supportive transverse logistics actors – Private (P) Food suppliers 
Carriers 
3PLs 
Private sector 
Real estate 
PA 
PB 
PC 
PD 
PE 
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Supportive transverse logistics actors – Institutional (I) Police 
Air Force 
Army 
Local Authorities 
IA 
IB 
IC 
ID 
Supportive transverse logistics actors- International (I) NGOs IE 
Table 2. Participation Frequencies of Logistics and Humanitarian Actors 
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Upstream 1 0 1 1 0 2 0 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 100 7 
Link 0 0 1 1 0 2 5 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 100 5 
Midstream 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 0 0 2 0 100 8 
Link 0 0 1 2 0 0 3 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 0 100 7 
Downstream 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 1 1 100 6 
Link 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 1 100 7 
Beneficiaries 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 1 100 6 
No of logistics 
operations 
2 0 7 9 0 4 9 2 2 6 14 1 2 7 3   
No of parties 
involved 
5 4 5 4 4             
 
Switching to a relief networks analysis perspective, it can be observed that the number of parties involved range 
from four to five for both humanitarian response systems. 
 
4. The armed conflict’s response system 
Table 3 summarizes the findings from the interviews that enrich the representation of the supply chain 
characterization by highlighting the storage and distribution facilities, specifics on the food aid commodities moved 
and the manpower employed; all three features apply for the four supply chain segments defined in the 
characterization: upstream, midstream, downstream and beneficiaries. In addition, special focus is also given to 
specifics of the transportation links between the four segments. 
Table 3. Armed conflict response system: supply chain outsourcing characterization 
  International relief operations Domestic relief operations 
Supply chain 
segment 
Feature UN Cluster approach  UARIV 
Upstream Storing/Distribution 
facilities 
Located at harbour cities, outsourced to a 
third party logistics (3PL) by the WFP 
Located in proximities to the affected area and in the 
central region, run by local/central governments or a 
third party (private) and outsourced to private food 
market suppliers 
 Food aid commodities Imported bulk commodities from UN 
facilities in Panama 
Food aid kits set up by Sphere's standards§ [5] 
purchased to food aid suppliers 
 Manpower at 
facilities 
Outsourced to a private third party logistics 
by the WFP 
Outsourced or owned by the food aid supplier 
contracted 
 
 
§ One of the most widely known and internationally recognized sets of common principals and universal minimum 
standards in life-saving areas of humanitarian response. 
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Link Transportation mode Road, outsourced to private carriers by the 
WFP 
Road, outsourced to carriers or owned by the food 
supplier contracted 
Midstream Storing/Distribution 
facilities 
Located at midsize cities, outsourced to 
private third party logistics by the WFP 
Typically located in urban areas nearby the 
beneficiaries, rented to the real-estate market by the 
local government 
 Food aid commodities Bulk commodities Food aid kits set up by Sphere's standards 
 Manpower at 
facilities 
Outsourced to a third party logistics (3PL) 
by the WFP 
Owned by the local government 
Link Transportation mode Road, outsourced to private carriers by the 
WFP 
Road, owned by the local government 
Downstream Storing/Distribution 
facilities 
Located in the affected area, so that rural 
and urban demand fulfilment is pursued, 
rented to the real-estate by outsourced 
NGOs  
Typically located in the urban areas where food is 
directly handed to beneficiaries by a walking 
distance, temporary point of distribution privately 
owned 
 Food aid commodities Bulk commodities, packed in rations at this 
point 
Food aid kits set up by Sphere's standards 
 Manpower at 
facilities 
Outsourced to NGOs Owned by the local government 
Link Transportation mode Road and Fluvial, privately owned by 
outsourced NGOs 
Road, owned by the local government 
Beneficiaries Storing/Distribution 
facilities 
Located in the disaster area by a walking 
distance from beneficiaries. Also called sub-
points of distribution. Temporary and 
privately owned 
Occasional food aid home delivery directly to 
beneficiaries, temporary point of distribution 
privately owned 
 Food aid commodities Food aid kits are configured as handed to 
beneficiaries (WFP standards) 
Food aid kits set up by Sphere's standards 
 Manpower at 
facilities 
Outsourced to NGOs Owned by the local government 
 
 
5. Natural disaster’s response system 
Just like Table 3 does, Table 4 summarizes the interviews findings that enriches the supply chain characterization 
through which the food aid to the affected by natural disasters is deployed. 
 
Table 4. Natural disasters response system: supply chain outsourcing characterization 
  Domestic relief operations  Domestic relief operations (Institutional approach) 
Supply chain 
segment 
Feature Colombian Red Cross (CRC) Civil Defence (CD) UNGRD 
Upstream Storing/ 
Distribution 
facilities 
A central main warehouse, 
privately owned 
Strategically located in 
smuggling-prone areas, 
privately owned 
Mostly located in central region 
and occasionally in Province's 
capitals nearby the disaster 
area, run by central government 
and outsourced to private food 
market suppliers 
 Food aid 
commodities 
Food aid kits set up by Sphere's 
standards from material 
convergence (donations) 
Food aid commodities from 
confiscated smuggled food 
Food aid kits set up by Sphere's 
standards purchased to food aid 
suppliers 
 Manpower at 
facilities 
Privately owned Privately owned and 
volunteers 
Outsourced or owned by the 
food aid supplier contracted 
Link Transportation 
mode 
Road, fluvial, aerial both 
outsourced to private carriers 
and privately owned 
Road, privately owned or 
outsourced to local carriers by 
local governments 
Road, outsourced or owned by 
the food supplier contracted 
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Midstream Storing/ 
Distribution 
facilities 
Strategically located nearby 
disaster prone areas, privately 
owned 
Strategically located in 
disaster prone areas, privately 
owned 
Located at the nearest 
municipality from the disaster 
area, temporary points of 
distribution run by the local 
governments 
 Food aid 
commodities 
Food aid kits set up by Sphere's 
standards from material 
convergence (donations) 
Food aid commodities from 
confiscated smuggled food 
and purchased on the food 
market 
Food aid kits set up by Sphere's 
standards purchased to food aid 
suppliers 
 Manpower at 
facilities 
Privately owned Privately owned and 
volunteers 
Privately owned by local 
governments or outsourced  
Link Transportation 
mode 
Road, fluvial, aerial both 
outsourced to private carriers, 
territorial and privately owned 
Road, Fluvial and aerial, 
privately owned or with 
support of Air Forces and the 
Army 
Road, Fluvial, outsourced to 
local carriers 
Downstream Storing/ 
Distribution 
facilities 
Located at most Province 
capitals and the closest 
municipality to the affected area 
(collection points), privately 
owned or rented to the real-estate 
Located at Province's capitals 
and municipalities, run by the 
Civil Defence Headquarters in 
Provinces 
Not applicable. Purchased food 
aid kits are directly transported 
to the disaster area 
 Food aid 
commodities 
Food aid kits set up by Sphere's 
standards from material 
convergence (donations) 
Food aid commodities from 
confiscated smuggled food 
and purchased on the food 
market 
Food aid kits set up by Sphere's 
standards purchased to food aid 
suppliers 
 Manpower at 
facilities 
Privately owned and volunteers Privately owned and 
volunteers 
Privately owned by local 
governments or outsourced  
Link Transportation 
mode 
Road, fluvial, aerial both 
outsourced to private carriers, 
territorial entities and privately 
owned 
Road and Fluvial, privately 
owned or with support of the 
Army 
Road, Fluvial, outsourced to 
the local transportation market 
Beneficiaries Storing/Distribution 
facilities 
Located at the disaster area by a 
walking distance from 
beneficiaries, also called by the 
CRC as points of distribution. 
Outsource to the real estate if 
needed 
Located at the disaster area by 
a walking distance from 
beneficiaries, temporary points 
of distribution privately owned 
Located in the disaster area by 
a walking distance from 
beneficiaries.  Temporary 
points of distribution privately 
run by local governments 
 Food aid 
commodities 
Food aid kits set up by Sphere's 
standards from material 
convergence (donations) 
Food aid commodities from 
confiscated smuggled food 
and purchased on the market 
Food aid kits set up by Sphere's 
standards purchased to food aid 
suppliers 
 Manpower at 
facilities 
Privately owned and volunteers Privately owned and 
volunteers 
Privately owned by local 
governments or outsourced  
 
 
6. Analysis and policy implications 
Considering the multiple supply chains in addition to the response systems for the manmade and natural disasters in 
Colombia, the analysis approach is presented by supply chain segment. This is, both response systems are analysed 
in parallel within each supply chain segment in question in order to encourage collaboration between them under the 
assumption that a more efficient overall performance may be achieved if logistics capabilities of either response 
system in the same segment were shared or added in case a large-scale disaster occurred. Besides, some policy 
implications out of the mere description of the current logistics operations for each response system are presented as 
an approach for bridging commercial and humanitarian logistics practices in the manmade and natural disasters 
context. 
 
6.1 Upstream 
The armed conflict humanitarian response system, represented in this analysis by one international relief network 
(the UN cluster approach) and one domestic relief network (the National Unit for “Victims” Response and 
Reparation- UARIV approach), uses a variety of significantly different strategies to manage facilities through which 
food aid is deployed. On one hand, the UN cluster approach imports all of its food aid commodities from the UN 
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humanitarian response depot located in Panama through harbour cities located at both the Pacific and Atlantic cost. 
Relying on the storage and materials handling by a Third Party Logistics (3PL) company in these coastal cities and 
under the supervision of the World Food Program, the bulk of food aid is then transported by road carriers to 
strategic warehouses located at inland cities. On the other hand, the UARIV approach not only fully relies on the 
domestic private food markets when starting the food aid deployment but also directly purchases food aid kits to 
food suppliers under the supervision of local and central governments. These suppliers may transport food to 
requested locations using their own fleet or outsourcing road transportation to carriers. Such evident differences 
bring along challenges and implications for the upstream supply chain for the armed conflict response system. Some 
of these are: 
x Future collaboration between the two relief networks is encouraged in order to support response to potential 
larger scale manmade disasters. This collaboration would be subject to resolving the differences in strategy that 
are a consequence of either lower costs or shorter lead times, or other operational pluses that lead the one to 
purchase bulk food aid internationally and the other one to purchase food aid kits in the domestic food market. 
x The fact that the UARIV approach contracts private food suppliers all around the country may be a crucial factor 
to shorten lead times to the midstream the supply chain. However, the interview findings revealed that proximity 
to the impacted area might not be the driving factor for local and central authorities to choose the supplier; the 
supplier’s selection is driven by other kind of interests.    
x Local and central governments typically outsource the food aid inventory management to a third party once 
purchased from suppliers. The interviews revealed that such third parties may lack the knowledge and tools that 
help them make the right decisions about how much to order and how often, given the volatility of demand 
patterns of those in need, which certainly translate into longer deprivation times for beneficiaries. Although the 
UN cluster approach does not do a much better job managing the inventory to ensure more stable and shorter 
deprivation times, the fact that they have no obligation by law to distribute food aid as the UARIV does, means 
that the distribution strategy is based on a set deterministic demand pattern. Hence managing an inventory system 
that is easy to keep under control means that they fulfill 100% of the needs of the impacted population targeted.  
x Outsourced carriers are the vast majority of transportation providers for both relief networks in this segment, 
which could be positive for achieving competitive transportation rates that benefit local authorities and the WFP 
with lower rates. However, for the UARIV relief network, economies of scale opportunities may also be 
disregarded as the number of disconnected suppliers spread out in the national territory increases.  
 
The natural disaster humanitarian response system is represented in this analysis by three domestic relief networks; 
these are the Colombian Red Cross (CRC), Civil Defence (CD) and the National Unit for Disaster Management and 
Response (UNGRD). Although the CRC and the CD is part of the organizational framework of the UNGRD, they 
are treated here as independent relief networks due their own capabilities to the deploy food aid from upstream to 
downstream in the supply chain. Another striking factor that distinguishes among these three relief networks is the 
preferred sources for acquiring food aid commodities.  Just like the UARIV, the UNGRD purchases 100% of the 
food aid kits that local authorities request for when declaring the national calamity status. Conversely, although 
differing from the supplying source as well, the CRC and CD fully rely on materiel convergence when setting up the 
food aid kits or commodities to be deployed to beneficiaries. CRC typically acquires donations from the private 
sector and individuals and organization that make up the social fabric. The CD acquires commodities from the 
Colombian Tax and Customs Organization (DIAN), which donates food commodities confiscated in smuggling-
prone areas such as international borders. However, an important commonality in this segment is that carriers are 
typically contracted to move aid to midstream in the supply chain despite the fact that privately owned transport 
fleet is also operated by the CRC and CD in larger scale disasters, and also logistically supported by the Police 
Department. A challenge and implication out of these differences and commonality is: 
x The fact that each relief network supplies from different sources and under completely different legal frameworks 
strongly challenges logistics partnership among the networks due to their commodity-oriented supply chain 
strategy despite the fact that beneficiaries are awaiting to relieve the same humanitarian needs.  However, under 
the occurrence of larger scale disasters, these differences should not overshadow the crucial logistics capabilities, 
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that if not shared as much as possible, would impede logistics capabilities balancing, overwhelming some of 
them while underusing others in specifics segments of the supply chain.   
 
6.2 Midstream 
When it comes to the armed conflict humanitarian response system, once the bulk of food aid arrives to the 
warehouses in the inland cities, the UN cluster approach remains outsourcing both the warehousing and the 
transportation to the next segment to carriers by contracting a 3PL. In contrast, the UARIV deliveries food aid kits 
to a new actor in the segment, the local authorities. Either owning or renting warehousing facilities, local authorities 
typically proceeds with materials handling and manages transportation to downstream with its fleet of vehicles. 
Consequently, although in the same segment, both relief networks differ significantly since the UN cluster approach 
continues taking the most from economies of scale by still managing bulked food aid commodities, while the 
UARIV approach is already transporting food aid kits to downstream in the supply chain. Using technical logistics 
terms, the UN cluster approach keeps postponement methods until very far downstream in the supply chain (last 
mile).  This notable difference brings along challenges and implications for midstream in the supply chain of the 
armed conflict response system, one of them is: 
x Being in the same segment, the UN cluster approach forwards the total national distribution strategy to only two 
depots, the UARIV does forward distribution to several dozen depots given the multiple suppliers contracted. 
Future collaboration between these two relief networks is encouraged to synergistically respond to larger scale 
manmade disasters caused by the armed conflict. Hence, it is worth checking, for future research and policy 
implications, whether completely migrating both relief networks to any of the following strategies would bring 
performance improvement in terms of operational and deprivation costs:  i) Leveraging economies of scale by 
distributing bulk food aid from a single supplier and sticking to postponement strategies. ii) Completely 
migrating to a multiple supplier approach with food aid kits already configured at this point.   iii) A combination 
of both, this is, each approach partially applying to each relief network.  
 
Relying on strategic warehouses located in disaster-prone areas, the natural disaster humanitarian response system 
represented by the CRC and the CD, manages their own storing and materiel handling operations where materiel 
convergence is the focus operations in these facilities. Meanwhile, the UNGRD migrates to a new logistics actor as 
the contracted suppliers are asked to deliver food aid kits at facilities either privately owned by local governments or 
rented real estate. Transportation to downstream in the supply chain represents a key difference in this segment as 
well. Fully delegating the distribution process to private carriers and the local distribution capacities of the social 
fabric, local authorities differ from the CRC and the CD as they not only delegate on carriers and social fabrics but 
also support on their own distribution capabilities and other institutions’ such as the Police Department, Air Force 
and the Army. One challenge and implication from these key differences is: 
x The fact that at this segment of the supply chain, the CRC and CD strategic warehouses are located in proximity 
to the disaster-prone areas may be a great chance for local authorities to take the most from distribution 
capabilities of the CRC and CD. However, the fact that suppliers are totally disconnected with these two 
institutions as the food aid kits purchased by them are typically distributed to local authorities instead, make this 
possibility almost unreachable. Also consider that the CRC and CD strategic warehouses might be far enough 
from the local authority if this one is located outside a “disaster-prone” area.  
 
 
6.3 Downstream 
In regard to the armed conflict humanitarian response system, this supply chain segment presents another important 
difference for the relief networks responding with food aid to manmade disasters. The UN cluster migrates to a new 
logistics actor by relying on an NGO from this point on and up to beneficiaries’ hands. Only now does repacking 
rations for each commodity, so that food aid kit configuration takes place in the last mile supply chain segment. 
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Meanwhile, the UARIV approach continues delegating both the storing and distribution to a third party under the 
supervision of local governments. However, a commonality is the fact that both approaches typically transport 
commodities to beneficiaries by using privately owned vehicles in the last mile. A challenge and implication for 
these segments is: 
x Trusting on a humanitarian NGO as a logistics operator as opposed to relying on a third party whose experience 
in managing food aid distribution under humanitarian contexts is typically null, may be a key issue for explaining 
any differential performance between the two relief networks. 
 
A cornerstone difference within the natural disaster humanitarian response system in this segment is the existence of 
dozens of facilities that the provincial headquarters of the CRC and CD own for all kind of humanitarian operations. 
Although the CD have representation in almost 90% of Colombian municipalities, and the CRC have presence in all 
provinces’ capital municipalities, and despite the fact that not all of them are guaranteed to facilitate humanitarian 
logistics operations for food aid distribution if needed, these are supporting pieces in the network. In contrast, local 
authorities, delegated by the UNGRD, don’t count on any other facility to break down the distribution directly to 
beneficiaries. A challenge and an implication out of this is: 
x In light of the occurrence of larger scale disasters that required the involvement of the CRC and CD network 
located downstream from the strategic warehouses, it is worth exploring the direct connection between the 
UNGRD suppliers/carriers with any of these facilities before reaching local authorities and third parties if this 
represented any performance improvement in the overall supply chain.  
 
6.4 Last mile (beneficiaries) 
Two striking differences are easily detected in this segment regarding the armed conflict response system. The UN 
cluster, represented at this point by the NGO, on one hand, does not use a civil facility as such when performing 
distribution to beneficiaries’ hands since this process takes place in the distribution vehicle itself, typically in rural 
areas. In addition, all commodities are repacked in individual rations so that food aid kits are configured as being 
handed to beneficiaries so that the postponement tactic is effective until the very last moment in the supply chain.  
On the other hand, the UARIV approach does use a facility, typically a shelter located in urban areas, to distribute 
food aid kits to beneficiaries’ hands. Some challenges and implications for this segment are: 
x Fully relying on the domestic food supply market intrinsically exacerbates the risks associated to disruptions in 
the last mile distribution due to the lack of neutrality of the carrier and supplier when delivering to communities 
under the influence of the armed conflict.  
x Food suppliers and carriers contracted by the UARIV focus their distribution in urban areas primarily, while the 
like in remote areas is under the leadership of the UN cluster approach. A remaining question to justify this fact 
is whether suppliers and carriers find it difficult to operate the local distribution in rural areas due to potential 
inabilities to overcome non-conflict restrictions associated with the logistics operation itself, such as accessing 
beneficiaries only reachable by fluvial navigation or by multiple small cargo capacity four wheel drive vehicles. 
 
Reaching disaster locations while facilitating beneficiaries’ accessibility to aid is a commonality for the relief 
networks ending the supply chain for the natural disaster humanitarian response system. In fact, all of the relief 
networks analysed typically resort to setting up a point of distribution, or so-called sub-point of distribution, 
utilizing a civil facility whether rented real state o privately owned. Additionally, although carriers play an important 
role in the last mile distribution, institutional support is equally important as the CRC, CD, Police Department, 
Armed Forces and the Army count on an important transportation fleet to serve distribution operations. Still, a 
challenge and policy implication for the natural humanitarian response system at this segment is: 
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x In spite of the strong institutional capabilities that the UNGRD count on for food aid distribution capabilities in 
the last mile, these are strongly constrained as well as the disaster area may have limited access to non-neutral 
humanitarian actors in areas under the influence of the armed conflict. Hence it is worth exploring how the 
institutional capabilities are complemented and/or replaced with other local distribution capabilities like the ones 
offered by the social fabric.  
 
7 Conclusions 
Although the UN cluster approach is the only international relief network from the armed conflict humanitarian 
response system studied here, the humanitarian mission of this relief network has responded to large-scale natural 
disasters in Colombia as well.  The fact that the UN clusters deploys food aid distribution within both response 
systems is a vivid recognition of how common logistics capabilities are required to respond to disasters irrespective 
of the kind, manmade or natural. Hence, future research should be oriented to identifying opportunities to respond 
recognizing synergies among relief networks across humanitarian response systems under the assumption that 
logistics capabilities shared in the same segment is a reasonable starting point. For instance, the UARIV and the 
UNGRD, the official relief networks of each response system, contract suppliers to distribute food aid kits to local 
authorities and third parties. However, the humanitarian logistics know how of these local authorities and third 
parties is not guaranteed down in the supply chain. Hence strengthening logistics capabilities of local governments, 
such as adopting inventory management systems that respond to the demand patterns of those in need, or bridging 
the social fabrics to help overcome the transportation constraints imposed by the armed conflict and the geographic 
conditions in the last mile, would support better overall performance of the supply chain. Such strengthening would 
turn the local authority into an actual humanitarian actor able to logistically respond to both manmade and natural 
disasters.  
This overall analysis exposes the evident need for policy makers and practitioners to understand the humanitarian 
response system holistically and managerially, and as a pull of opportunities for sharing logistics capabilities and 
networking parties towards logistics partnership in the light of effectively alleviating the suffering of those in need. 
In addition, this analysis also exposes the need for the humanitarian actors to continue evolving towards switching to 
humanitarian logistics practices, which although differ significantly with commercial logistics, can support on 
supply chain analysis tools that are applicable to both commercial and humanitarian logistics as long as the 
appropriate dynamics are incorporated in the analysis.  
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